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RETHINKING ADJUDICATIVE JURISDICTION IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Satya T. Mouland† 
Abstract: The contribution of national courts to international law has long been 
doubted in the international law literature. As an aspect of the state’s power to prescribe, 
courts have been conceived as organs that merely apply the state’s laws, which may give 
effect to an international law norm. According to this conception, national courts merely 
apply and operate within the state’s national legal system and rarely have a direct 
contribution to international law. However, in enforcement proceedings for international 
arbitral awards, arising at the intersection between the law of state immunity and the law 
governing the enforcement of arbitral awards, a number of cases challenge this 
interpretation. In this area, adjudicative jurisdiction may be emerging as a specific 
manifestation of the state’s enforcement jurisdiction––that is, the power to induce or 
compel compliance with a state’s laws. In view of the lack of clarity regarding the lawful 
scope of a state’s enforcement jurisdiction in international law, which is arising 
increasingly in a globalized world where jurisdictional disputes cross territorial borders, 
the approach put forward in this study may be useful for uncovering potential state 
practice which may crystalize as customary international law. This article seeks to draw 
attention to this practice, illustrating how a conception of adjudicative jurisdiction as 
enforcement jurisdiction is not only timely and useful, but also potentially reflective of 
emerging state practice. It sets some normative foundations for how such an approach 
may be defensible and identifiable, thereby proposing that this topic is worthy of further 
exploration. 
Cite as: Satya T. Mouland, Rethinking Adjudicative Jurisdiction in International Law, 29 
WASH. INT’L L.J. 173 (2019). 
I. INTRODUCTION
In an increasingly globalized world in which disputes often cross
territorial borders, jurisdictional conflicts between states arise. In this 
context, international law may become important for resolving questions of 
which state, and on what basis, has jurisdiction. This problem emerges in 
light of the recent Enrica Lexie dispute,1 currently pending before an Annex 
† Satya Talwar Mouland is a fully-funded third year PhD candidate (Queen Mary Research 
Studentship) at Queen Mary University of London. Her PhD thesis, under the supervision of Dr. Stephen 
Allen, Dr. Paul Gragl, and Professor Julian Lew QC, is entitled “An Inquiry on the Scope of International 
Arbitral Authority: Common Approaches to Enforcement Jurisdiction.” Satya has previously published in 
the European Law Students’ Association and Asian Law Students’ Association journals. She has presented 
at several conferences, including the Queen Mary Society of Legal Scholars Graduate Conference, at the 
Sorbonne, and was selected to participate in the two-week Atlas Agora Programme in Dublin in 2018. 
Satya is a fluent German speaker and advanced French speaker.  
1  Case Overview, The “Enrica Lexie” Incident (Italy v. India), PERMANENT COURT OF 
ARBITRATION, https://pca-cpa.org/en/cases/117/ (last visited Dec. 1, 2019). 
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VII Tribunal, which is an arbitral tribunal constituted under Annex VII of the 
UN Convention for the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS”).2 The dispute arose 
after two Indian fishermen were shot by Italian marines just outside Indian 
territorial waters. India brought criminal proceedings against the Italian 
marines, claiming the right to prosecute on the basis of the so-called “Lotus 
Principle”—which holds that states have authority to adopt laws allowing 
them to prosecute persons provided that the state’s actions are not prohibited 
by international law.3 Italy contested India’s jurisdiction, claiming instead 
that the controversy should be governed by UNCLOS because it concerned a 
question of “interpretation or application” of the treaty.4 Thus, on the one 
hand, there was a conflict between the applicable regime (UNCLOS or 
general rules of jurisdiction). However, for our purposes, we are concerned 
with the separate issue pertaining to the lack of clarity in the international 
resolution of the dispute. The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea 
(“ITLOS”), established under UNCLOS Article 287(1)(a) and Annex VI, 
issued a provisional measures order halting Indian criminal proceedings.5 
However, it did not determine the merits of the matter––namely which state, 
and on what basis, had jurisdiction to enforce its criminal laws in respect of 
the dispute? A lack of clarity in answering these questions was 
acknowledged by Judge Paik in the Provisional Measures Order.6 The 
dispute is now pending before an Annex VII arbitral tribunal, which is a 
default method of dispute resolution for cases concerning the interpretation 
or application of UNCLOS.7 However, given the restricted mandate of the 
Annex VII Tribunal to decide questions of interpretation under UNCLOS8, it 
2  United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 (entered into 
force Nov. 16, 1994) [hereinafter UNCLOS]. 
3  The Lotus Principle, which is contentiously debated by scholars, derives from the famous Lotus 
decision of the Permanent Court of International Justice and is still being relied on by states in cross-border 
disputes of this context. See generally S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), Judgment, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10 
(Sept. 7). 
4  See The Enrica Lexie (It. v. India), Case No. 24, Order of Aug. 24, 2015, ¶ 38, 
https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no.24_prov_meas/24_published_texts/2015_24
_Ord_24_Aug_2015-E.pdf; see also UNCLOS art. 288(1), supra note 2, at 510 (“A court or tribunal 
referred to in article 287 [regarding choice of procedure] shall have jurisdiction over any dispute 
concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention which is submitted to it in accordance with 
this [Section 2. Compulsory Procedures Entailing Binding Decisions].”). 
5 Enrica Lexie, Order at ¶ 141. 
6 Enrica Lexie (It. v. India), Case No. 24, Declaration of Judge Paik in Order of Aug. 24, 2015, 
at ¶ 2, https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no.24_prov_meas/ 
24_published_texts/2015_24_O_240815_D_Pai-E.pdf (“[T]he present dispute between Italy and India 
comes down to the question of which State has jurisdiction over the incident.”). 
7 See Case Overview, The “Enrica Lexie” Incident, supra note 1. 
8 See UNCLOS Annex VII, supra note 2, at 571–74. 
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is unlikely that the tribunal will address the broader question of which state 
should have enforcement jurisdiction.  
For our purposes, “enforcement jurisdiction” is not considered from 
the narrower viewpoint adopted in some public international law texts, 
which is that it is only permitted in the territory of a foreign state with that 
state’s consent.9 Instead, enforcement jurisdiction, as used here, may 
encompass any acts of states to “induce or compel compliance” with their 
laws or through their courts.10 This is the definition adopted in The 
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law and will be considered 
authoritative for these purposes. As acknowledged by the late Professor 
Cassese, “the great jurist observes . . . that the ‘original and persistent flaw 
of the international legal order’ is the lack of legislative, judicial and 
enforcement organs acting on behalf of the whole community.”11 From the 
outset, it must be noted that this is inevitable, given the decentralized nature 
of the international legal order, as acknowledged widely in the literature.12 
However, the importance of the capacity of states to compel or induce 
compliance cannot be denied. It goes to the very functioning of the 
international legal order and is the means by which international law is given 
effect. Professor Harold Koh has found, for example, that the principal 
means by which international law is enforced are states’ abilities to induce 
compliance.13 In his words, “repeated compliance gradually becomes 
obedience.”14  
In light of the lack of clarity regarding enforcement jurisdiction, and 
its importance more generally, this article examines how “adjudicative 
jurisdiction,” that is, the decision-making authority of national courts, may 
be reconceived as a possible source of a state’s enforcement jurisdiction. As 
9  See, e.g., Christopher Staker, Jurisdiction, in INTERNATIONAL LAW 313 (Malcom D. Evans ed., 
4th ed. 2014) (enforcement is only mentioned in passing, and it is stated as only permitted in the territory of 
a foreign state with that state’s consent); MALCOM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 472 (8th ed. 2017). 
10  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 401(c) (AM. LAW INST. 1987). This is 
an academic document compiled by the American Law Institute and not an official document of the United 
States. It has been compiled by legal academics and practitioners and is based on comparative law sources. 
It will thus be considered as an authoritative source for how jurisdiction is conceived according to state 
practice. 
11  Antonio Cassese, Remarks on Scelle’s Theory of “Role Splitting” (dédoublement fonctionnel) in 
International Law, 1 EUR. J. INT’L L. 210, 212 (1990). 
12  See Thomas Schultz & Niccolo Ridi, Comity and International Courts and Tribunals, 50 
CORNELL J. INT’L L. 578, 579 (2017). 
13  See generally Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599 
(1997). 
14  Id. at 2603. 
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a source of any potential practice, decisions in the area of international 
arbitration will be drawn upon. This is an area where it may be unsurprising 
that such practice is emerging, given the special nature of international 
arbitral tribunals as bodies constituted on the consent of the discrete parties 
to the dispute (and thus operating, in principle, outside of state structures) 
but which depend, for the enforcement of their decisions, on national courts. 
National courts are the principal public bodies ensuring that international 
arbitral tribunals’ authority is heeded. 
The emergence of adjudicative jurisdiction as a possible source of any 
international law rules of enforcement jurisdiction challenges the orthodox 
discourse in public international law scholarship that adjudicative 
jurisdiction is merely a facet of a state’s “prescriptive jurisdiction”, or its 
authority to adopt laws.15 The relevant source is customary international 
law,16 though there is no scope within this article to examine whether any 
custom has crystallized. Instead, this article seeks to make a theoretical 
contribution to understanding how adjudicative jurisdiction as potential 
enforcement is worthy of further investigation. Such an approach would 
allow new potential state practice to be considered as a source of any rules.  
To test this hypothesis: first, I examine the underlying theoretical 
approach that would allow adjudicative jurisdiction to be considered as a 
possible manifestation of enforcement jurisdiction under public international 
law; second, I examine this approach in context to illustrate how decision-
making authority may be viewed as enforcement, focusing mainly on case 
law arising in the area of international arbitration; third, I look at how an 
approach which conceives of international law in national courts rather than 
national courts in international law may run into difficulties, and thus 
propose the latter should be adopted; fourth, I examine the extent to which 
principles underpinning “authority” (that is, the power of states, generally, 
under international law, which may be exercised through prescriptive, 
adjudicative or enforcement power) could assist in the coordination of 
consistent approaches to enforcement jurisdiction between courts (as 
15 This orthodoxy is still promulgated by major textbook authors. See, e.g., Staker, supra note 9, at 
309 (defining jurisdiction as “to make, apply and enforce rules of conduct[,]” which the judiciary only 
applies or interprets (but does not develop)); Michael Akehurst, Jurisdiction in International Law, 46 BRIT. 
Y. B. INT’L L. 145 (1972–73) (analyzing adjudicative jurisdiction solely as a form of state prescriptive 
jurisdiction). 
16  See Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1)(b) (referring to international custom as a 
source of international law) [hereinafter ICJ Statute]. 
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opposed to jurisdiction as a specific exercise of state sovereignty, for 
example). 
II. ADJUDICATIVE JURISDICTION AS AUTHORITY
Before examining the law of adjudicative jurisdiction, it is important
to understand how commentators treat the general concept. Mainstream 
public international law commentators treat adjudicative jurisdiction as part 
of a state’s prescriptive jurisdiction.17 This means that a national court 
merely has the capacity to interpret international law norms to the extent that 
the state has adopted laws. Thus, their capacity to contribute to any 
international law directly is inherently limited by the state where they are 
located. However, as will be illustrated in the following section, adjudicative 
jurisdiction ought to be considered as conceptually distinct from prescriptive 
jurisdiction. This provides a useful starting point for determining potential 
state practice. 
A. Adjudicative Jurisdiction as Prescriptive Jurisdiction
The first approach may be illustrated by use of the seminal Trendtex
decision.18 The Central Bank of Nigeria issued an irrevocable letter of credit 
in favor of the claimant, a Swiss company, to pay for 240,000 tons of cement 
that the claimant sold to an English company.19 Upon shipping the cement, 
there was congestion at the port of discharge and the Central Bank declined 
to make the payments.20 The English Court of Appeal was seized to consider 
the question of whether it could exercise jurisdiction in respect of the 
Central Bank of Nigeria—a governmental department of the state. 
According to the international principle of state immunity, the 
capacity of a state to exercise adjudicative jurisdiction in respect of a foreign 
state is restricted. However, in Trendtex, the court found that due to the 
principle of international law which now recognizes that sovereign immunity 
should not be afforded to government departments in connection with 
commercial transactions, its jurisdiction was available. Thus, for what the 
court declared, it gave effect to the international law rule according to which 
a state may be impleaded before the courts of foreign states insofar as its 
17  See Staker, supra note 9; SHAW, supra note 9; Akehurst, supra note 15. 
18  Trendtex Trading Corporation v. Central Bank of Nigeria [1977] 1 QB 529 (Eng.). 
19  Id. at 529. 
20  Id. 
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commercial activities are concerned (jus gestionis). However, in terms of the 
effect of that decision, the court did nothing more than declare what 
Nigeria’s rights and obligations were. It did not compel or induce the 
compliance of Nigeria with its obligations. 
According to this approach, courts and other judicial authorities are 
the means by which the state makes its law applicable to the activities, 
relations, or status of persons (prescriptive jurisdiction).21 This is reflective 
of the general approach taken by authors examining adjudicative 
jurisdiction.22 These authors consider adjudicative as merely declaratory of 
the state’s prescriptive power and, thus, ultimately constrained by the extent 
to which the national law adopts the international norm. Thus, Trendtex is 
exemplary of an approach according to which courts can be viewed as 
giving effect to a state’s prescriptive power. 
B. The Lotus Decision on Jurisdiction
In order to understand the potential contribution of adjudicative
jurisdiction to international law, it is useful to distinguish this conception 
from the traditional conception of jurisdiction as a specific exercise of 
sovereignty. The traditional conception based on sovereignty can be traced 
to the Lotus decision.23 Despite the criticisms of this approach more 
generally, which will be outlined below, a conceptual distinction between 
prescriptive and adjudicative jurisdiction is in line with the Permanent Court 
of International Justice’s approach in Lotus.24 
The Lotus dispute concerned a collision between French and Turkish 
ships, resulting in the death of several Turkish sailors.25 Turkey exercised its 
criminal jurisdiction over the French captain.26 Both parties consented to the 
Permanent Court of International Justice (“PCIJ”) to decide the question of 
whether Turkey had been permitted to exercise such jurisdiction.27 Thus, the 
21  Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 401 (Am. Law Inst. 1987). 
22  See, e.g., Akehurst, supra note 15; SHAW, supra note 9, at 472; Staker, supra note 9, at 309; see 
also 1 OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW 456 (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds., 1992). 
23  See S.S. Lotus, at 18–19; see also Alex Mills, Rethinking Jurisdiction in International Law, 84 
BRIT. Y. B. INT’L L. 190, 190–94 (2014). 
24  Though the Lotus decision has been widely criticized, it is useful, as a conceptual matter, to 
distinguish it here because the basis upon which a state may exercise jurisdiction (state sovereignty) still 
pervades much of the literature. See, e.g., Staker, supra note 9; SHAW, supra note 9. 
25  S.S. Lotus, at 5. 
26  Id. 
27  Id. at 12. 
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decision is of little authoritative guidance for this article since it concerned a 
state’s prescriptive jurisdiction and not adjudicative jurisdiction. This is also 
clear from the very formulation of the question before the court: “Has 
Turkey . . . acted in conflict with the principles of international law[?]”28 
This question differs from the one addressable here: whether there are any 
principles according to which Turkey could have lawfully exercised 
jurisdiction. 
However, the decision still pervades much of the international law 
literature on the doctrine of jurisdiction more generally, which provides a 
useful foundation for distinguishing the approach being suggested herein––
that is, adjudicative jurisdiction as a possible manifestation of a state’s 
general authority under international law, rather than a specific exercise of 
state sovereignty. With regard to prescriptive jurisdiction, the PCIJ found 
that a state is permitted to do all that it is not prohibited from doing.29 In this 
regard, the PCIJ approached the question of Turkish criminal jurisdiction 
under international law in the negative—whether there were any principles 
not prohibiting Turkey from exercising jurisdiction (rather than asking 
whether there are any allowing the exercise).30 This formulation suggests 
that the PCIJ assumed that states have broad discretion to exercise 
jurisdiction because international law governs only prohibitive rules of 
jurisdiction. With regard to enforcement jurisdiction, the court stated that 
this is generally prohibited within the territory of another state absent a 
state’s consent.31 This can be interpreted in line with the court’s approach to 
prescriptive jurisdiction as requiring some authorizing act upon which 
enforcement jurisdiction is based (a “permissive rule”). 
However, viewing adjudicative jurisdiction as a possible source of 
authority would not be out of step with the court’s own view on the nature of 
the international legal order. It stated in this regard, at p. 18 of its judgment: 
International law governs the relations between independent 
States. The rules of law binding upon States therefore emanate 
from their own free will as expressed in conventions or by 
28  Id. at 5.  
29  See S.S. Lotus, at 18. 
30  See id. at 19 (“It does not, however, follow that international law prohibits a State from exercising 
jurisdiction in its own territory, in respect of any case which relates to acts which have taken place abroad, 
and in which it cannot rely on some permissive rule of international law.”). 
31  Id. 
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usages generally accepted as expressing principles of law and 
established in order to regulate the relations between these co-
existing independent communities or with a view to the 
achievement of common aims. 
An approach which conceives of adjudicative jurisdiction as a specific 
manifestation of the state’s authority which may be exercised in a number of 
forms (for example, prescriptive and enforcement power) is useful for a 
number of reasons. First, it does not restrict the capacity of a national court 
to exercise jurisdiction under the formal consent of the particular state to the 
international law norm. This observation was made by Judge Bruno Simma 
in his criticism of the Lotus decision in the Kosovo advisory opinion of the 
ICJ.32 Judge Simma explained that the so-called “Lotus Principle” does not 
speak to the question of the legality of jurisdiction because stating that 
something is not prohibited does not logically mean it is therefore permitted. 
There may be a number of principles in between permitted and prohibited 
according to which a state may lawfully exercise jurisdiction, though they 
are not required to do so on the basis of some authorizing act (which may, 
for example, give effect to an international norm as part of national law). 
The question of whether a state is required to exercise jurisdiction according 
to an established international law principle (such as jus gestionis) is distinct 
from the question of whether it would not be prohibited from doing so, and 
such an exercise would accord with the principle of sovereign equality. Put 
differently, there may be lawful grounds of adjudicative jurisdiction which 
are not expressly authorized by an international law principle, but which are 
still lawful because they accord with a principle underpinning authority. 
“Authority” in this sense is the capacity of states to act, through prescriptive, 
adjudicative, and enforcement means, and will be used interchangeably with 
the concept of “jurisdiction” throughout. 
Conceiving of jurisdiction as a specific exercise of sovereignty can, 
moreover, be criticized from several angles. For example, a focus on the 
extent to which a state may apply its own laws to foreign conduct may place 
too much emphasis on a state’s sovereignty without considering the 
32  See Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect 
of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. Rep. 403, at 478, 480 (July 22) (Declaration of Judge Simma) 
[hereinafter Kosovo Advisory Opinion, Decl. of Judge Simma]. 
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concomitant obligation of state responsibility under international law.33 
Under the law of state responsibility, national courts are conceived as the 
organs of states, and thus, to the extent that their decisions engage a norm of 
international law, national courts are capable of engaging the state’s 
responsibility.34 Nonetheless, at the outset, it must be acknowledged that it is 
still the dominant approach as a matter of positive law.35  
  However, an approach to jurisdiction which conceives of jurisdiction 
as a specific exercise of sovereignty overlooks whether there are any other 
grounds upon which a state may lawfully exercise its jurisdiction over a 
foreign state, which are not necessarily permitted or prohibited. 
Consequently, in view of disputes such as the Enrica Lexie, where conflicts 
of jurisdiction between states and jurisdictional regimes are occurring, this 
approach ought to be adopted. 
C. Adjudicative Jurisdiction as Distinct from Prescriptive Jurisdiction
From this starting point of “jurisdiction” as “authority” more widely,
it becomes possible to view a state’s adjudicative jurisdiction as 
manifestation of enforcement. The following sections illustrate this by 
applying various lenses to case law examples in the area of international 
arbitration, where this practice may be arising. Consequently, this section 
illustrates the utility of an approach that understands adjudicative 
jurisdiction as not merely a facet of a state’s prescriptive jurisdiction through 
the concrete example of national court proceedings related to arbitrations. 
Though international arbitration is not the principal focus of this article, it is 
an area in which national courts are the principle “public” bodies which may 
ensure the enforcement of this particular international court’s decisions.36 
33  See MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL 
LEGAL ARGUMENT 224–302 (2007) (arguing that too much emphasis on sovereignty risks a “utopian vision 
of international law.” This should be tempered with a view on responsibility).  
34  See Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, 1949 
I.C.J. Rep. 174, at 179 (Apr. 11) (national courts may also be responsible on behalf of states as their organs
or agents); see also Int'l L. Comm'n, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful
Acts, Rep. on the Work of its Fifty-Third Session, at 34, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001), reprinted in [2001] 2
Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 26, A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.l (Part 2).
35  See, e.g., Paul Gragl, Jurisdictional Immunities of the State in International Law, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF JURISDICTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 229 (Stephen Allen et al. eds., 2019) (Chapter 11). 
36  Though international arbitral tribunals tend to be considered as “private” institutions by a number 
of arbitration scholars. See generally GARY BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (2nd ed. 
2014); MARGARET MOSES, THE PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 
1 (3rd ed. 2017) (“Arbitration is a private system of adjudication. Parties who arbitrate have decided to 
resolve their disputes outside any judicial system.”); NIGEL BLACKABY ET AL., REDFERN AND HUNTER ON 
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Thus, it is the principal source of any potential practice relating to the lawful 
scope of a state’s enforcement jurisdiction. 
1. Applying Scelle’s Dédoublement Fonctionnel
To better understand this perspective, it is useful to apply the lens of 
Georges Scelle’s dédoublement fonctionnel theory.37 Scelle argued that courts 
have a dual role when they act within the international legal sphere: not only 
as state organs that apply national law, but also as international agents 
(gouvernants et agents specifiquement internationaux). According to this, 
even while applying a rule of national law, a national court may act in the 
international sphere insofar as its decision engages a norm of international 
law. Put differently, when a national court acts in the international legal 
sphere and exercises jurisdiction, the exercise of its authority may engage a 
norm of international law.  
  To illustrate the consequences of such an approach, take the example 
of LR Avionics.38 LR Avionics, a company registered in Israel, had obtained 
an arbitration award against the Federal Republic of Nigeria in a dispute 
arising out of a contract between them for the supply of military 
equipment.39 The arbitration was seated in Nigeria and subject to Nigerian 
law.40 LR Avionics applied to a U.K. court for enforcement of the arbitral 
award.41 Despite there being no link to U.K. territorial jurisdiction as a 
matter of private or public international law (or the “public sphere”), an 
English commercial court ended up considering the scope of its authority to 
enforce the award.42 For our purposes, this is a potential exercise in the 
international sphere, seeing as there was no connection to the state’s 
territorial jurisdiction, and thus, no national law that could justify the 
exercise of the court’s authority on its own. The court found that it had the 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 415 (6th ed. 2015). However, some public international law scholars have 
considered international arbitral tribunals as potential international law courts to the extent that they 
exercise decision-making authority in the public sphere. See, e.g., ARMIN VON BOGDANDY & INGO VENZKE, 
IN WHOSE NAME? A PUBLIC LAW THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 1 (2014). 
37  On the doctrine of dédoublement fonctionel see generally GEORGES SCELLE, 1 PRÉCIS DE DROIT 
DES GENS 43, 54–56, 214 (1932) (Vol I); GEORGES SCELLE, 2 PRÉCIS DE DROIT DES GENS 10, 319, 450 
(1934); see also Cassese, supra note 11. 
38  See LR Avionics Technologies Limited v. The Federal Republic of Nigeria, Attorney General of 
the Federation of Nigeria [2016] EWHC (Comm) 1751 (Eng.). 
39  Id. at [4]. 
40  Id. 
41  Id. at [7]. 
42  Id. at [4]. As the seat of the arbitration was Nigeria, the arbitral body applied Nigerian law; the 
defendant was the Republic of Nigeria and the claimant was registered in Israel. 
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power to declare the foreign award as enforceable, and such a power was not 
excluded by the foreign state’s immunity.43 From a perspective of how the 
decision is declaratory of any international law rule, one might point to the 
court’s reasoning with regard to the availability of its jurisdiction to declare 
the award enforceable under section 101 Arbitration Act of 1996.44 This 
gives effect to Article I of the Convention on the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Arbitral Awards (“New York Convention”)45 as part of U.K. 
law, providing for the enforcement of arbitral awards irrespective of where 
they are made. The Commercial Court found that Section 101 proceedings to 
enforce an award are “proceedings which relate to the arbitration” within the 
meaning of Section 9 of the SIA and thus do not attract immunity.46 Thus, 
for what the court declared, it found that its jurisdiction was not excluded by 
the foreign state’s immunity. However, when viewing the court’s exercise of 
authority in the public sphere as potential evidence of any rule, it is possible 
to understand the act of enforcing––what the court did––as another source of 
any potential international law rule. Put differently, as a consequence of the 
court’s excercise of its jurisdiction to ensure that the award was declared 
enforceable in the public sphere, this may be suggestive that this form of 
jurisdiction arises as an aspect of the court’s general jurisdiction and 
principles of immunity operate as lex specialis to this. Insofar as such a rule 
is shared widely by other courts in the public sphere, this might be evidence 
of a growing rule according to which the power to declare an award 
enforceable is a generally lawful aspect of a court’s international 
adjudicative authority. 
2. Third Restatement
The new edition of The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law
of the United States, a source compiled on the basis of comparative law 
research by the American Law Institute, also reflects this conceptual 
distinction between adjudicative and prescriptive jurisdiction.47 It has added 
“adjudicative jurisdiction” as a separate category to prescriptive and 
enforcement jurisdiction.48 In his commentary on the Third Restatement, the 
43  Id. at [21]–[23]. 
44  Id.; see Arbitration Act 1996, c. 23, § 101 (Eng.). 
45  New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 
U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter New York Convention]. 
46  LR Avionics, at [21] – [23]. 
47  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 401(b) (AM. LAW INST. 1987). 
48  See id. 
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late Cecil J. Olmstead, former president of the International Law Association 
and an advisor on the Third Restatement, points out that the addition of 
adjudicative jurisdiction does not just reflect an actualization of prescriptive 
jurisdiction (i.e., an exercise of the “law-making process” by the state 
through its courts under international law) but is rather the manifestation of a 
specific exercise of enforcement jurisdiction (i.e., the enforcement of a 
prescription through a judicial process).49 This seems to acknowledge, at 
least as a conceptual matter, that adjudicative jurisdiction is a separate 
source of international law and a possible source of a state’s enforcement 
power. Moreover, under section 431, “jurisdiction to enforce,” the 
relationship between prescriptive jurisdiction and enforcement jurisdiction is 
quite clear: a state may only enforce its laws if it has jurisdiction to prescribe 
such laws.50 However, there is no such limitation prescribed under section 
421, “jurisdiction to adjudicate.” In this respect, in principle, a state may 
exercise jurisdiction through its courts whenever it would be “reasonable”.51 
Consequently, the Third Restatement also supports an approach according to 
which there is no inherent restriction on a state’s authority to adjudicate to 
the prescriptive power of the state. Instead, through the addition of 
“adjudicative jurisdiction” as an additional category, the authors of the Third 
Restatement have acknowledged that adjudicative jurisdiction may be a 
separate source, and thus, a separate source of potential state practice. 
III. ADJUDICATIVE JURISDICTION AS A SPECIFIC EXERCISE OF
ENFORCEMENT JURISDICTION—UNCOVERING DIFFERENT APPROACHES
This section will illustrate, through a selection of representative case
law examples in the area of arbitration, the different ways in which 
adjudicative jurisdiction may be treated as enforcement jurisdiction. This 
further supports the theoretical approach (that considers adjudicative 
jurisdiction as state authority) laid out in the previous sections by 
demonstrating its relevance in the practice of national courts. The first 
approach considers how national courts may act as enforcement agents as a 
consequence of the enactment of an international norm as domestic law. The 
second approach considers how courts may attain this status from the 
inherent powers of domestic courts in international law. The third approach 
49  See Cecil J. Olmstead, Jurisdiction, 14 YALE J. INT'L L. 468, 469–70 (1989). 
50  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 431 (AM. LAW INST. 1987). 
51  Id. § 421 (“A state may exercise jurisdiction through its courts to adjudicate with respect to a 
person or thing if the relationship of the state to the person or thing is such as to make the exercise of 
jurisdiction reasonable.”) (emphasis added). 
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considers the issue through comparison of the approaches of different 
national courts’ legal reasoning in decisions engaging international norms. 
This third comparative approach considers situations where national courts 
exercise authority despite there being no connection between the forum and 
the controversy. 
Beginning with the first approach, a domestic court may be obliged to 
recognize it has jurisdiction because of the enactment of an international rule 
within national law. Viewed on their own, judicial decisions are merely 
declaratory of the scope of a state’s prescriptive jurisdiction. This point can 
be illustrated not only by the effect of the Trendtex decision, as examined 
above, but also by its reasoning. In Trendtex, Lord Denning stated “in the 
last 50 years there has been a complete transformation in the functions of the 
sovereign state. Nearly every country engages in commercial activities. It 
has its departments of state––or creates its own legal entities––which go into 
the market places of the world. They charter ships. They buy commodities. 
They issue letters of credit”.52 As a result of what Denning now stated to be 
a “modern rule of international law”, he found that since Nigeria engaged in 
these commercial activities, “it is [not] open to the Government of Nigeria to 
claim sovereign immunity in respect of commercial transaction”.53 
Consequently, the court’s decision could, at best, be viewed as declaring the 
existence of the principle54 of jus gestionis.  
Reversing the mode of analysis to consider not merely international 
law in national courts, but national courts in international law, new potential 
practice on enforcement may be considered. In his article, Domestic Courts 
in International Law: The International Judicial Function of National 
Courts, Professor Antonios Tzanakopoulos points out that domestic 
decisions may be “constitutive” of rules of international law.55 As such, we 
should consider “domestic courts in international law” rather than 
“international law in domestic courts.”56 To consider the latter, it is useful to 
apply Immanuel Kant’s philosophy of law to consider whether adjudicative 
52  Trendtex, at 555. 
53  Id. 
54  This is a (normative) principle rather than a rule. See, e.g., HAZEL FOX & PHILLIPA WEBB, THE 
LAW OF STATE IMMUNITY 484 (Sir Frank Berman ed., 3d ed. 2013). Since there are still other approaches, 
jus gestionis can at best be considered a principle which has not yet crystallised into a source of 
international law. 
55  Antonios Tzanakopoulos, Domestic Courts in International Law: The International Judicial 
Function of National Courts, 34 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 133, 135 (2011). 
56  Id. 133–37. 
186 WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL VOL. 29 NO. 1 
jurisdiction may be a manifestation of enforcement jurisdiction according to 
an inherent power of national courts.57  From the “practical necessity” 
(praktische Vernunft) perspective, Kant describes the possibility that law 
may have some inherent quality.58 An act or a principle, for example, 
freedom (Wille) is distinguished from freedom of choice (Willkür). While 
freedom of choice is a desire that is not merely based in an action, but also in 
a reason for choosing to act in a certain way, freedom is fundamentally 
grounded in practical necessity. This perspective might be fruitfully applied 
to the notion that national courts’ actions, and not merely their decisions, 
may be constitutive of law. If courts consistently act in a particular way—
such that (though they may not expressly state as much) the effect of their 
decisions is enforcement—then a practical necessity perspective would 
justify considering such practice as law. This is because there is something 
inherent in the act, which may itself be constitutive of law when taken 
together with other similar acts (to the extent it is in conformity with 
principles underpinning international law).     
To illustrate the effect that this approach would have to understanding 
adjudicative jurisdiction as potential state practice on enforcement, consider 
the decision in Diag Human.59 In Diag Human, a Liechtenstein blood 
plasma company sought to enforce an award against the Czech Republic in 
the U.S. courts.60 As a matter of private international law, neither the parties 
nor the controversy had links to the United States or came under U.S. 
jurisdiction.61 The United States District Court for the District of Columbia 
dismissed the case, stating that it lacked jurisdiction to enforce the award 
because there was no commercial relationship between the parties, and 
therefore, the New York Convention did not apply.62  The New York 
Convention requires contracting states (of which there are 159, including the 
United States) to enforce international arbitration awards “irrespective of 
where they are made.” However, the United States has adopted a reservation 
in limiting the application of this principle to “commercial” activities.63 
57  See generally Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, in PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY 353–603 
(Mary J. Gregor ed. & trans., 1996) (1797). 
58  See id. at 370–85. 
59  Diag Human S.E. v. Czech Rep. Ministry of Health, 824 F.3d 131, 131 (D.C. Cir. 2016). 
60  Id. at 132. 
61  Id. 
62  Id. at 134. 
63  Contracting States, NEW YORK ARBITRATION CONVENTION, 
http://www.newyorkconvention.org/countries (last visited Sept. 19, 2019). 
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Upon appeal, the district court’s dismissal was reviewed de novo.64 This 
time, the U.S. Court of Appeals considered the scope of its authority to 
enforce the award broadly and in accordance with specific requirements of 
foreign state immunity enacted in U.S. law.65 Section 1605(a)(6) of the 
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”) provides the general exception 
in respect of proceedings related to arbitrations.66 The court found that under 
section 1605(a)(6) there was a legal relationship between the parties and a 
governing legal instrument, and consequently, it could exercise its 
jurisdiction to recognise and enforce the arbitral award.67 Thus, by 
interpreting the FSIA’s exception in the negative, and considering its 
jurisdiction as not excluded under the statute, the court exercised jurisdiction 
to enforce the award. 
However, the Diag Human court’s exercise could not be identified if 
one scrutinized the reasoning of the court alone. In other words, the court did 
not expressly state that it would be permitted to exercise jurisdiction to 
enforce the award because some national or international norm obliged it to 
do so. Nonetheless, the effect of the exercise ensured enforcement of the 
award in conformity with the principle of enforceability under the New York 
Convention. Though the New York Convention was not the source of the 
court’s authority, it informed the court’s decision as to why it ought to 
exercise its authority.68 Accordingly to this, the court exercised authority in 
the public sphere to enforce the award.  
Widening out to the third approach it becomes possible to identify 
further practice which may crystallize into customary international law.69 
Customary international law requires widespread, consistent and 
representative practice.70 As explained, it is not being examined whether this 
64  Diag Human, 824 F.3d at 134. 
65  Id. 
66  28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(6) (2016). 
67  Diag Human, 824 F.3d at 134–37. 
68  See Diag Human S.E. v. Czech Rep. Ministry of Health, 907 F.3d 606, 608–09 (D.C. Cir. 2018) 
(“We enforce foreign arbitral awards according to the New York Convention, part of a carefully crafted 
framework for the enforcement of international arbitration awards.”) (internal quotations removed). Thus, 
the New York Convention is merely the framework within which the national court considers the scope of 
its authority but does not oblige them to exercise jurisdiction. 
69  This would, of course, require the further conditions of widespread and representative practice, as 
well as opinio juris on the part of the affected states, which outside the scope of this article.  
70  As has been widely accepted—see, e.g., the recent ILC articles on the subject. Int'l Law Comm'n, 
Rep. on the Draft Conclusions on Identification of Customary Int'l Law, With Commentaries, U.N. Doc. 
A/73/10, 2018, at 122–29 (2018); see also Michael Wood & Omri Sender, State Practice, in THE MAX 
PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (2017) (ebook), 
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has emerged in any particular area, but rather how an approach which 
conceives of exercises of adjudicative jurisdiction as potential state “acts” 
may contribute to the identification of such practice. This might begin with 
the second approach for identification of such practice, which examines 
other exercises of decision-making authority to find commonalities between 
national courts. Thus, to the extent that national courts exercise enforcement 
forms of authority consistently with each other and in accordance with the 
relevant principles of international law which underpin authority,71 this may 
be evidence of growing customary international law relating to lawful 
grounds of enforcement jurisdiction.  
Beginning with the Diag Human decision, there are many decisions in 
other jurisdictions in which national courts have effectively exercised 
enforcement jurisdiction to ensure that an international arbitration award 
would be declared enforceable. For example, in Svenska Petroleum,72 in 
France, an arbitration award was rendered against the Republic of Lithuania 
in favor of a Swedish company, Svenska Petroleum, according to the 
International Chamber of Commerce (“ICC”) Arbitration Rules. The parties 
had selected these rules to govern their dispute. However, a U.K. court—
without any territorial connection to the dispute—was faced with deciding 
whether it could enforce the award. The court found that it had jurisdiction 
over the proceeding to declare the award enforceable because the arbitral 
award fell within the meaning of Section 9 of the UK State Immunity Act 
1976 (“SIA”).73 Consequently, the court followed the approach in LR 
Avionics and exercised jurisdiction to enforce the award. Thus, both for what 
the court decided and its exercise of authority to enforce, the decision may 
be viewed as a possible source of state practice to the extent that the same 
approach is shared by other courts. The consequence of any such practice 
would be that, at least as far as a court’s power to declare an award 
enforceable, this form of jurisdiction would be viewed, as between those 
courts, as a lawful exercise of enforcement. 
https://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e1107; Brian Lepard, 
The Need for a New Theory, in CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW: A NEW THEORY WITH PRACTICAL 
IMPLICATIONS 6 (2010) (“[T]he traditional definition of customary international law as consisting of the 
dual elements of state practice and opinio juris has a long pedigree.”). 
71  See infra Part V. 
72  Svenska Petroleum Exploration AB v. Government of the Republic of Lithuania [2006] EWCA 
(Civ) 1529, [2007] QB 886 (Eng.). 
73  Svenska Petroleum, at [116]. 
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IV. POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF MONISM AND DUALISM DISTINCTION ON
UNDERSTANDING ADJUDICATIVE JURISDICTION AS A POSSIBLE SOURCE
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
Through examination of the different approaches of monism and
dualism, this section further illustrates why national courts’ contributions 
should be perceived as a question of domestic courts in international law 
rather than international law in domestic courts. For these purposes, 
“monism” and “dualism” describe how the national and international legal 
orders relate to each other. Monism treats the national and international legal 
systems as part of the same system.74 Dualism views national and 
international legal systems as separate in principle, and thus, generally 
requires the national legislature to adopt an international norm for it to 
become binding in the state’s national courts.75  
From the perspective of how international law is given effect in 
national courts, it might be easier to see how a national court could 
contribute to international law from the monist perspective as it 
automatically views international law as part of national law. The basic 
approach of monism is well explained by the monist, Hans Kelsen.76 In his 
influential work, Pure Theory of Law, the Austrian jurist theorized that every 
legal concept and body of law derives its legal validity from some basic 
norm (Grundnorm). Thus, legal principles and concepts belong to a body of 
law but also derive their validity (or existence) as law from the basic norms 
that govern them. According to this perspective, an exercise of decision-
making authority by a national court could contribute to international law in 
a more direct sense. To illustrate this through case law in a monist state, such 
as France, consider Creighton v. Qatar.77 In 1982, Creighton Limited 
concluded a contract to construct a hospital in Qatar. The contract provided 
74   Anthony Aust, MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 187 (2d ed. 2007). 
75  See Jordan J. Paust, Basic Forms of International Law and Monist, Dualist and Realist 
Perspectives, in BASIC CONCEPTS OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW – MONISM & DUALISM 244, 246 (Marko 
Novakovic ed., 2013). 
76  See generally HANS KELSEN, REINE RECHTSLEHRE: EINLEITUNG IN DIE RECHSTWISSENSCHAFT 
[PURE THEORY OF LAW] (Max Knight ed. & trans., Lawbook Exchange 2002) (1934). See also Torben 
Spaak, Kelsen on Monism and Dualism, in BASIC CONCEPTS OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW – MONISM & 
DUALISM 322–43 (Marko Novakovic ed., 2013). 
77  Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court of judicial matters] 1e civ., July 6, 2000, Bull. civ. I, No. 
207 (Fr.); see also Creighton Limited v. Ministre desFinances de l'Etat du Qatar, Cour de cassation, 6 July 
2000, 18 ASA Bulletin 605–09 (2000). 
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for the final settlement of disputes by ICC arbitration.78 After a dispute 
arose, an arbitration award was rendered in favor of Creighton, which 
subsequently sought to attach funds of the Qatari Ministry of Domestic 
Affairs held in France by the Qatar National Bank and the Banque de 
France.  Since the question of the Cour de Cassation’s jurisdiction to order 
attachment against Qatar arose “in light of principles of public international 
law concerning immunities of the foreign state,” the case presented the 
French judiciary with an opportunity to consider the scope of its execution 
jurisdiction.79 The court ordered attachment of Qatar’s assets, stating that it 
was sufficient that the arbitral award became binding, to establish its 
jurisdiction.80 This line of reasoning conflicts with the notion that sovereign 
immunity exempts a court’s execution jurisdiction.81 The court cited Article 
24 of the ICC Arbitration Rules, which provides that binding ICC awards 
must be enforced, as a principle that justified the exercise of its jurisdiction 
in the public sphere.82 However, the court exercised its jurisdiction “in light 
of the public international law principles governing immunities.”83 Thus, 
even as a declaratory matter, the case can be viewed as an instance of a 
national court’s contribution to the potential lawfulness of execution 
jurisdiction in this context (arbitration) because the court itself stated that its 
jurisdiction was not excluded by the international principle of state 
immunity. Put differently, since immunity places the principal bar on a 
court’s enforcement authority, then a declaration that it does not might 
support a principle according to which execution jurisdiction is generally 
permissible. 
On the other hand, in dualist states, such as the United Kingdom, it 
may be more difficult to point to significant decisions which have developed 
the law on enforcement jurisdiction since international law is not the source 
of the court’s authority but is given effect through national legislation. To 
78  Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court of judicial matters] 1e civ., July 6, 2000, Bull. civ. I, No. 
207 (Fr.). For an English translation of the facts, see Creighton Limited v. Minister of Finance and Minister 
of Internal Affairs and Agriculture of the Government of the State of Qatar, Cour de Cassation [Supreme 
Court], 6 July 2000, in XXV Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 443–534 (Albert Jan Van de Berg ed., 
2000). 
79  Creighton Limited, supra note 77, at 608. 
80  Id. (“vu les principes du droit international . . . attendu d’en execution de sentences arbitrales 
devenues définitives” [“having regard to principles of public international law . . . pending execution of 
final arbitral awards”]) 
81  As put forward in major state immunity textbooks. See, e.g., Fox & Webb, supra note 54, at 484. 
82  Creighton Limited, supra note 77, at 608. 
83  Id. 
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illustrate, in the area of state immunity, the United Kingdom has adopted 
legislation that gives effect to the international principle of state immunity as 
a matter of national law. Under section 1 of the SIA, a state is prohibited 
from exercising jurisdiction over a foreign state unless a specific enumerated 
exception applies. Consequently, exercises of decision-making authority 
arising as an exception to this rule may be authorized, at least formally, by a 
national law provision (such as section 9 of the SIA in the case of 
arbitration). A good example is the Pearl Petroleum decision, which 
concerned a London Court of Arbitration (“LCIA”) proceeding between 
Pearl Petroleum, a Swiss company, and the Kurdistan Republic of Iraq.84  
During arbitration the Kurdistan Republic failed to comply with certain 
orders of the tribunal, as a result, the tribunal issued a peremptory order that 
instructed the Kurdistan Republic to pay Pearl Petroleum $100 million.85  
Under section 42 of the Arbitration Act of 1996, U.K. courts are 
empowered to enforce arbitral tribunal peremptory orders. Consequently, the 
question of whether the court could exercise jurisdiction in this case arose at 
the intersection between the law governing the enforcement of peremptory 
orders and the law of state immunity, rather than as a direct consequence of 
implementation of the international principle of state immunity.86 When Iraq 
failed to comply with the order, Pearl Petroleum applied to the U.K. 
Commercial Court for enforcement of the order. The court rendered a 
decision in Pearl Petroleum’s favor.87 Thus, by the court’s exercise of 
authority in respect of the foreign state, its act was declaratory of a potential 
rule relating to the legality of supportive jurisdiction. Thus, the approach 
suggested may become more important in order to fully analyze the 
contribution of courts located in states which adopt dualist approaches. For 
what it did, rather than said, the court’s act may be evidence of the rule that 
an exercise of its supportive jurisdiction is permissible. Thus, the “act,” or 
particular “exercise,” by the court rather than merely what the court said 
becomes all the more important where international law is an indirect source 
of the court’s decision-making authority.   
 Thus, at least from the perspective of how international law is given 
effect in national courts, distinctions between the state’s approach to sources 
84  Pearl Petroleum Company Limited v. The Kurdistan Regional Government of Iraq [2015] EWHC 
(Comm) 3361, [2016] 4 WLR 2 (Eng.). 
85  Id. at [11]. 
86  Id. at [16] (considering the application state immunity). 
87  Id. at [53]. 
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may provide limitations on the extent to which they can be understood to 
contribute to international law. Viewing national courts in international law, 
on the other hand, would allow their potential contribution to be considered 
irrespective of these distinctions. One method would be to compare 
exercises of decision-making authority in the international sphere, as 
illustrated in the previous section. 
V. PRINCIPLES UNDERPINNING AUTHORITY FOR THE COORDINATION OF
COMMON APPROACHES
Considering exercises of authority as possible sources of any state
practice on enforcement jurisdiction, which has been the overall aim of this 
article, the question arises as to how we should coordinate the approaches of 
national courts. This question emerges where consistent approaches may 
emerge which have not yet crystallized into customary international law. The 
works of Anne-Marie Slaughter, a legal theorist, and Yuval Shany, an 
international lawyer, have considered coordination of courts.88 In Regulating 
Jurisdictional Relations Between National and International Courts, Shany 
studies the need to regulate jurisdictional interactions between national and 
international courts and any rules of international law that should, or could, 
govern such interactions.89 However, Shany only considers how courts may 
have an interpretative function in international law, and not if their decision-
making authority could make more fundamentally contribute to international 
law.90  
Similarly, taking a globalist viewpoint, Slaughter considers how 
national courts may cooperate according to “common goals.”91 Though both 
authors demonstrate the normative desirability of coordination of courts, the 
lens of coordination has not been applied in a practical way to determine 
88  See generally Anne-Marie Slaughter, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2004); Anne-Marie Slaughter, A 
Global Community of Courts, 44 Harv. Int’l L.J. 191 (2003); Yuval Shany, REGULATING JURISDICTIONAL 
RELATIONS BETWEEN NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL COURTS (2007); Yuval Shany, THE COMPETING 
JURISDICTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS (2004). 
89  SHANY, REGULATING JURISDICTIONAL RELATIONS, supra note 88, at 4. 
90  Id. at 5, 32–34 (considering only the “de facto” relationship between courts and tribunals, which 
creates shared “harmonizing features”). Interaction is considered under provisions of the ICSID 
Convention, which permits investors to initiate proceedings without the need to seize national courts. Thus, 
the extent to which national courts or other bodies are actually coordinated according to law is not 
analyzed, but merely how under certain harmonizing instruments these bodies could be coordinated as a 
normative matter. 
91  Slaughter, A Global Community of Courts, supra note 89, at 193 (viewing “participating judges” 
as part of such coordination). 
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whether national courts are actually coordinated in any particular area. This 
final section examines how principles of international law may assist in the 
coordination of consistent approaches amongst national courts, thus 
illustrating which principles may already harmonize consistent approaches. 
A. Comity
The first potential harmonizing principle is comity. According to its
most widely accepted definition, at least in the field of private international 
law, comity is the “recognition which one nation allows within its territory to 
the legislative, execution and judicial acts of another nation.”.92 However, 
there is a wide variety of understandings regarding the legal nature of 
comity. On the one hand, some scholars, such as F. A. Mann, find that 
comity is merely a “byword for international law.”93 From this 
understanding, comity binds the courts to exercise jurisdiction because 
international law necessitates they do so.94 At the other end of the spectrum, 
comity may merely be a discretionary principle according to which the court 
may exercise jurisdiction depending on the particular facts of the case.95 In 
between these two viewpoints exists the idea that comity is binding in some 
way which requires deference of one court to another in view of some 
international or foreign interest.96 Whichever view is adopted, all seem to 
agree that comity plays some kind of jurisdiction-regulating rule because it 
ensures that one court has jurisdiction rather than another, thereby operating 
as a jurisdiction-allocating tool.97 
Authors such as F. A. Mann who consider comity as public 
international law-related in nature (i.e., binding on courts as a matter of 
international law) work primarily in the field of private international law and 
92  Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163–64 (1895). 
93  See, e.g., Frederick Alexander Mann, The Doctrine of Jurisdiction Revisited After Twenty Years, 
in 186 RECUEIL DES COURS [COLLECTED COURSES] 9 (The Hague Acad. of Int’l Law 1984). 
94  Joel R. Paul, The Transformation of International Comity, 71 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 19, 20 
(2008). 
95  Id. This is regarded as the historical role of comity by some authors but also has some resonance 
today. See, e.g., Niels Jansen Calamita, Rethinking Comity: Towards A Coherent Treatment of 
International Parallel Proceedings, 27 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 601, 606 (2006) (comity as a discretionary 
principle in the jurisdiction of U.S. courts to defer (or refuse to defer) to parallel courts). 
96   See Joel R. Paul, Comity in International Law, 32 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 4 (1991); Paul, supra note 
94, at 20. 
97  See Elisa D’Alterio, From Judicial Comity to Legal Comity: A Judicial Solution to Global 
Disorder?, 9 INT’L J. CONST. L. 394, 409–10 (2011) (D’Alterio calls this the “regulatory” function). 
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refer merely to the effects of comity within domestic systems.98 From the 
sovereign’s perspective, this comity is understandably international in nature 
since its purpose is, in some respects, international: the recognition of one 
sovereign’s acts within another sovereign’s system. 
However, from a public international law perspective, comity does not 
bind national courts in the same way that international law does.99 This can 
be illustrated by the use of comity in courts where the exercise of decision-
making authority has the potential to engage an international law norm 
(given there is no connection between the court and the dispute). This 
occurred, for example, in one of the national court proceedings related to the 
Yukos dispute with a number of shareholders, inter alia, Hulley 
Enterprises.100  
Hulley Enterprises, a Cypriot company, was a major shareholder in 
Yukos, a Russian privatized oil company.101 In 2003, the Russian Federation 
took a series of actions against Yukos, including ordering it to pay a total of 
$20 million in taxes.102 In 2004, shareholders, including Hulley Enterprises, 
notified the Russian Federation that Yukos had violated the Energy Charter 
Treaty (“ECT”), claiming that the company had failed to accord fair and 
equitable treatment to investors.103 The ECT establishes a multilateral 
framework for cross-border cooperation in energy disputes and provides for 
arbitration as the default method of dispute resolution. In 2014, an arbitral 
tribunal appointed under the auspices of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, 
rendered three final arbitration awards against Yukos, finding it had violated 
the ECT.104 The shareholders sought enforcement of the awards in several 
countries, including the United States, where actions were commenced in 
U.S. federal court seeking confirmation of the awards.105 The Russian 
Federation claimed that it was entitled to sovereign immunity, and thus the 
98  See generally Federick Alexander Mann, FOREIGN AFFAIRS IN ENGLISH COURTS (1986); Federick 
Alexander Mann, BEITRÄGE ZUM INTERNATIONALEN PRIVATRECHT [CONTRIBUTIONS TO INTERNATIONAL 
PRIVATE LAW] (Duncker & Humblot 1976); Mann, The Doctrine of Jurisdiction Revisited After Twenty 
Years, supra note 193.  
99  This perspective has also been suggested already as a theoretical matter. See Schultz & Ridi, supra 
note 12, at 581 (“the non-bindingness of the rules of international comity is clearly not disputed, but to 
conclude that they have no normative value whatsoever would be a non sequitur”). 
100  Hulley Enters. Ltd. v. Russ. Fed’n, 211 F. Supp. 3d 269, 269 (D.D.C. 2016). 
101  Id. at 272. 
102  Id. at 273. 
103  Id. 
104  Id. at 274. 
105  Id. 
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court had no jurisdiction to confirm the awards.106 Proceedings to appeal a 
decision to set aside the awards were also pending before a Dutch court.107 
In considering whether to grant a stay of proceedings pending an appeal 
against setting aside the awards in the Netherlands, the U.S. District Court 
found that the principle of comity would weigh in favor of the stay.108 Thus, 
the court not only considered its jurisdiction available, notwithstanding the 
principle of immunity, but also actually exercised a supportive form of 
jurisdiction (i.e., a stay) to halt its proceedings in favor of the arbitration. For 
our purposes, it is significant that the court considered comity weighed in 
favor of the stay. This was in view of the parallel Dutch proceedings, as the 
court stated: 
[I]n contrast, if the Dutch judgment is affirmed on appeal, the
shareholders may choose to stipulate to dismissal of this action
in view of this court's questionable ability to confirm an award
that has been “lawfully ‘set aside’ by a competent authority in
the state in which the award was made.” Should the
shareholders choose to proceed, this court would have to
consider interests in international comity and the avoidance of
conflicting judgments as part of its analysis as to whether any
such agreement existed.109
This is exemplary of how comity is generally used in this context. It is 
not used as a justification for the source of the court’s power but as the 
reason why the court should exercise the jurisdiction at its discretion in favor 
of the party seeking enforcement or resisting it. Consequently, from the 
perspective of national courts in international law, comity is no more than a 
discretionary principle, which may be used by courts as appropriate. 
This can be further demonstrated by the exemplary case of Hardy 
Exploration.110 Hardy Exploration & Production (“HEPI”), an Indian 
company, had obtained an arbitration award under a contract with the 
Government of India.111 The arbitration proceedings took place in Malaysia, 
as provided for in the contract, and the tribunal issued an award in HEPI’s 
106  Id. 
107  Id. at 275. 
108  Id. at 287. 
109  Id. at 285. 
110  Hardy Expl. & Prod. (India) Inc. v. Gov’t of India, Ministry of Petroleum & Nat. Gas, 314 F. 
Supp. 3d 95, 95 (D.D.C. 2018). 
111  Id. at 99. 
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favor.112 HEPI then sought to confirm the award in a U.S. court. India sought 
to have the U.S. proceedings stayed on the ground that the specific 
performance aspect of the award violated U.S. public policy.113  In deciding 
not to recognize the order for specific performance, the U.S. District Court 
for the District of Columbia found that the reason was because it would raise 
U.S. vulnerability, opening  up the United States to “claims against it for its 
sovereign acts within its own borders.”114 Indeed, one of the justifications 
used by the court as to why it would stay proceedings and not recognize the 
order was the fact that comity counters against “[a]ctions against foreign 
sovereigns in our courts [which] raise sensitive issues concerning the foreign 
relations of the United States.”115 However, this is a clear illustration of the 
type of political context in which the court might consider comity to be 
applicable. It does not relate to whether, as a matter of public international 
law, the court is obliged to exercise jurisdiction. It relates to whether there is 
a matter that the court considers an international concern—for example, 
whether it is permitted to exercise jurisdiction over a foreign state in view of 
the international principle of immunity. There are currently no clear 
circumstances in which courts are obliged to exercise jurisdiction in this 
context on the basis of comity. 
B. Sovereign Equality
Sovereign equality is a foundational principle of the international
legal order. As subjects of international law, states only have relative 
sovereignty.116 Kelsen explains that, while sovereignty is of the supremacy 
of states under international law (insofar as they are not subjected to the 
authority of another state), sovereign equality is the justification for legal 
authority itself.117 This does not mean that states have equal rights and duties 
under international law, but that they have the same capacity for rights and 
duties.118 Consequently, sovereign equality underpins the authority of states 
to act, more generally, under international law (rather than to exercise 
jurisdiction on the basis of sovereignty). Thus, to the extent that courts act in 
accordance with each other and the relevant principles of international law 
112  Id. at 101. 
113  Id. at 103. 
114  Id. at 114. 
115  Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 493 (1983).  
116  Hans Kelsen, The Principle of Sovereign Equality of States as a Basis for International 
Organization 53 YALE L.J. 207, 208 (1944). 
117  Id. 
118  Id. at 209. 
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applicable to a particular exercise of jurisdiction, such acts might be 
considered to be in conformity with the principle of sovereign equality. 
Taking the example of Yukos as one starting point for examining the 
effect of this approach, Yukos, a Luxembourg company which had been a 
member of the “Yukos” group in Russia, had obtained an arbitration award 
against OJSC Rosneft Oil, a Russian state-owned company.119 The decision 
concerned preliminary questions relating to the enforcement of four 
International Commercial Arbitration Court (“ICAC”) awards,120 which a 
Russian court had already annulled at the seat of arbitration.121 Given that 
assets against which enforcement was sought were located in the 
Netherlands, leave to enforce the award was granted by the presiding Dutch 
court. The basis for this was that the decision of the Russian court had been 
“partial and dependent,” with the consequence that the set-aside decision 
would not be recognized.122 The U.K. commercial court to which Yukos had 
applied to confirm the award found that the defendant, Rosneft, was issue-
estopped from denying that the Russian annulment decisions were the result 
of a partial and dependent proceeding as found by the Dutch court. This 
means that Rosneft could not rely on the argument that the Russian decisions 
were not partial and dependent in an attempt to challenge jurisdiction when 
the argument had already been relied on by them to appeal the earlier 
decision. Thus, by exercising jurisdiction to recognize the lack of validity of 
the Russian annulment decisions, the U.K. court, in effect, ensured that 
proceedings to enforce the award would be continued. 
One justification for such jurisdiction is the aim of enforcement of 
arbitral award irrespective of where they are enshrined in the New York 
Convention. However, in national court enforcement decisions relating to 
arbitral awards, the New York Convention is not treated as the source of the 
court’s authority. Instead, the principle of enforceability in article 1(1) of the 
convention, stating that awards must be enforced “irrespective of where they 
are made,”123 is a normative principle according to which the court ought to 
enforce the award.124 Thus, the court in Yukos could be viewed, from the 
international perspective, as ensuring enforceability in accordance with 
119  Yukos Capital Sarl v. OJSC Rosneft Oil Co [2011] EWHC (Comm) 1416 (Eng.). 
120  Id. at [2] (ICAC is located in Russia). 
121  Id. 
122  Id. at [107] 
123  New York Convention, art. 1(1). 
124  See, e.g., Diag Human, at 4. 
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article 1(1) of the New York Convention even though it was not the source 
of the court’s authority. 
Alternatively, the source of the authority could be a growing principle 
of customary international law according to which the jurisdiction is lawful 
because several courts exercise similar forms of enforcement jurisdiction in 
accordance with the applicable principles of international law (including the 
principle of enforcement in the New York Convention). Such a principle 
might be justified by the principle of sovereign equality to the extent that 
common approaches, which accord with any applicable international 
principle (such as, here, state immunity) are shared between the affected 
courts.125 
C. Rule of Law
The final principle according to which common approaches between
national courts could be coordinated is the rule of law. The rule of law in 
national legal systems is comprised of two elements: the legality of an 
exercise of public power (that is, the conformity with law)126 and the law’s 
justness.127 However, at the international level there is a third element: 
effective implementation.128 Professor Robert McCorquodale explains that at 
the international law level, unlike at the national law level, the rule of law 
has an additional enforcement function.129 This is because there is no 
sovereign at the international law level like at the national law level; thus, 
125 This is because customary international law requires widespread, consistent, and representative 
practice between affected states. If courts are “states” in such an analysis, then the practice would have to 
be shared between the affected courts.  
126  For example, an institution may not exercise its authority beyond the scope of authority conferred 
upon it. 
127  For example, where the exercise of public authority must be in accordance with international law 
norms—such as international human rights. There are formalists who merely consider the legal aspects. 
See, e.g., Joseph Raz, The Rule of Law and its Virtue, in JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON 
LAW AND MORALITY 210 (Clarendon Press 1979). Most formalists go beyond this to encompass notions of 
fairness and justice. See, e.g., Arthur Watts, The International Rule of Law, 36 GERMAN Y.B. INT’L L. 15, 
23 (1993); Simon Chesterman, An International Rule of Law, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 331 (2008). And certainly 
at the international level, this is how the rule of law has been applied. ANDRE NOLLKAEMPER, NATIONAL 
COURTS AND THE INTERNATIONAL RULE OF LAW 3–4 (2011) (the rule of law encompasses four elements: 
(1) public powers should be based on authority conferred by law; (2) public powers cannot change the law
at will; (3) exercise of powers must conform with fundamental civil and human rights; and, (4) public
powers that contravene legal obligations, whether international or national, must be “accountable” on the
basis of law).
128  See Robert McCorquodale, Defining the International Rule of Law: Defining Gravity, 65 INT’L 
COMP. L. Q. 277, 284–303 (2016). 
129  Id. at 289 (“yet legality by itself does not create an international rule of law. An effective legal 
order must provide for the enforcement of legal obligations”). 
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the rule of law would be of little effect without this additional principle. As 
Professor McCorquodale explains, “there is now an extensive range of 
international dispute settlement mechanisms that can operate in a manner 
that is consistent with the international rule of law.”130 However, these only 
emerge when one does not equate the national rule of law with the 
international rule of law, which McCorquodale states to be a “false 
equation”.131 From the perspective of adjudicative authority as merely 
declaratory of the state’s prescriptive jurisdiction, Professor Andre 
Nollkaemper has analyzed the possible contribution of national courts to the 
international rule of law as negligible.132 This is because Professor 
Nollkaemper only considers the international rule of law as comparable to 
the national rule of law, to the extent that public powers may be “controlled” 
by law, this is according to the concept of “accountability.”133 Thus, he does 
not address the question of whether national courts can themselves be 
“agents” of the international rule of law to the extent that they exercise the 
state’s enforcement function. 
To understand the perspective that national courts may be agents of 
the international law, it is useful to distinguish the effect of such an approach 
from the effect of the principle of sovereign equality in this area. To 
illustrate, the Yukos decision and Pearl Petroleum decisions may be 
compared.  
In Yukos, the setting aside of the award in view of the aim of 
enforcement could be viewed as giving effect to the principle of sovereign 
equality: the act of exercising jurisdiction did not itself give effect to a rule 
of enforcement, but rather the underlying reasoning for the exercise could be 
viewed as giving effect to that rule. To the extent that national courts follow 
similar reasoning in accordance with the relevant principles of international 
law (e.g., award enforceability and state immunity), then such exercises 
conform with the principle of sovereign equality. Compare this with Pearl 
Petroleum where the question to the U.K. commercial court was whether to 
recognize the peremptory order issued by the arbitral tribunal. As explained, 
it was the exercise of jurisdiction in the public sphere that gave effect to the 
130  Id. at 298. 
131  Id. at 289. 
132  NOLLKAEMPER, supra note 127, at 129, 299 (national courts’ role in the development of 
international rule of law is inherently limited by the fact that they are ultimately organs of states which are 
in control of them). 
133  Id. at 3–4. 
200 WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL VOL. 29 NO. 1 
rule in this regard. Thus, whereas decisions that are declaratory of particular 
rule could be justified on the basis of sovereign equality, exercises in the 
public sphere could themselves be justified because they are manifestations 
of the rule of law. This is because these exercises engage international law 
norms (since they are not connected to the territory of any one state) and 
thus, they may, by their nature, be manifestations of principles underpinning 
authority. 
However, there are some risks with treating national courts as 
potential conduits of the international rule of law.  For example, courts might 
purport to act in the name of the international rule of law, when in fact they 
are applying a national rule that may not accord with the international one. 
For example, a national court may exercise jurisdiction under the national 
authorizing statute, ignoring the wider context in which the rule it is 
applying developed, and thereby create bad law. This occurred in Republic 
of Argentina v. NML Capital.134 There, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the 
FSIA does not restrict the discovery of a foreign state’s extraterritorial assets 
in aid of post-judgment attachment, and thus the court had jurisdiction under 
the FSIA to grant such a measure. The court stated that its jurisdiction to 
grant the measure is based on the FSIA, which is the “sole basis” for federal 
court jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns because the FSIA is a 
“comprehensive” and “exhaustive” statement of the law in this regard.135 
Thus, the court essentially analyzed the scope of its jurisdiction to grant the 
measure on the text of the FSIA alone. 
Whether the decision to grant the discovery order is correct or not as a 
matter of principle, the reasoning that jurisdiction is based on a power 
granted to the state under the FSIA is flawed. It rests on a formalistic 
interpretation of the principle of state immunity within the context of the 
FSIA, failing to acknowledge that this act gives effect to the international 
principle of state immunity that restricts a court’s adjudicative jurisdiction in 
respect of a foreign state. Even if the discovery order could be viewed as a 
lawful exercise of enforcement, viewed on its own, it is unclear whether this 
particular exercise of jurisdiction would be in accordance with the 
international principle of state immunity. 
134  Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital, Ltd., 573 U.S. 134, 142 (2014); see also Foreign 
Sovereign Immunities Act of 1978 – Postjudgment Discovery – Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital Ltd., 
128 HARV. L. REV. 381 (2014), available at http://harvardlawreview.org/wp-
content/uploads/2014/11/Republic_of_argentina_v_NML_capital.pdf (last visited May 28, 2018). 
135  Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1978 – Postjudgment Discovery, supra note 134. 
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Thus, when considering the decisions of national courts, it is 
important that only decisions that properly apply relevant principles of 
international law, or those that can be rendered compatible with them, are 
recognized. It remains unclear whether the discovery order in NML Capital 
could have been rendered compatible with the principle of state immunity. 
On the one hand, it seems that it does not compel certain action against the 
foreign state, but merely assists in an ongoing proceeding. On the other 
hand, the proceeding which it assists would have the effect of compelling the 
foreign state to comply with a judgment. Thus, it is questionable whether the 
act of the court, in effect, is lawful or ought to be viewed as excluded by the 
international principle of immunity. 
Thus, while the international rule of law may, in theory, be a 
harmonizing principle, its integration within national legal systems raises 
certain issues regarding integration. One solution, which could be a subject 
of further research, would be to consider how exercises of decision-making 
authority may be constitutive of particular international principles 
underpinning authority, thereby applying these principles to determine the 
extent of “harmonization” of national court approaches irrespective of 
monist and dualist distinctions.136 
VI. CONCLUSION
To conclude, this article has illustrated that reconsidering adjudicative
jurisdiction as a possible manifestation of a state’s enforcement jurisdiction 
is a worthy question for further exploration. Such a conception may assist in 
the identification of potential state practice relating to the lawful scope of a 
state’s enforcement jurisdiction. This practice may, in turn, crystallize into 
customary international law, thereby providing solutions in cases such as 
Enrica Lexie where the lawful scope of a state’s enforcement jurisdiction has 
been at issue and remained unresolved. 
This article has examined the normative underpinning of this 
conception of adjudicative jurisdiction and how it gives public international 
lawyers a new framework to consider the decisions of national courts as a 
possible source of international law. As evidence of this practice, case law 
arising in the area of international arbitration has been analyzed and 
illustrates the validity of the approaches defended. 
136  This is the subject matter of my PhD thesis focusing on the area of international arbitration. 
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Further research could be conducted, applying some of the analytical 
threads examined herein, to identify whether there is any consistent practice 
in relation to the enforcement powers of national courts in the context of 
international arbitrations. Indeed, this is the subject matter of my PhD thesis. 
This article has merely sown the seeds of a normative approach which 
considers national courts in international law rather than international law in 
national courts. Adjudicative jurisdiction as a possible source of 
international law would allow public international lawyers to analyze 
decision-making authority in a more comprehensive manner and could 
provide a possible source of much needed rules of enforcement jurisdiction. 
This is useful, and arguably necessary, as jurisdictional conflicts will 
increasingly arise in our globalized world, and there is a lack of doctrinal 
clarity in the area of enforcement jurisdiction. 
